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Susceptibility to Ebbinghaus and Müller-
Lyer illusions in autistic children: a
comparison of three different methods
Catherine Manning1* , Michael J. Morgan2,3, Craig T. W. Allen4 and Elizabeth Pellicano4,5
Abstract
Background: Studies reporting altered susceptibility to visual illusions in autistic individuals compared to that
typically developing individuals have been taken to reflect differences in perception (e.g. reduced global
processing), but could instead reflect differences in higher-level decision-making strategies.
Methods: We measured susceptibility to two contextual illusions (Ebbinghaus, Müller-Lyer) in autistic children aged
6–14 years and typically developing children matched in age and non-verbal ability using three methods. In
experiment 1, we used a new two-alternative-forced-choice method with a roving pedestal designed to minimise
cognitive biases. Here, children judged which of two comparison stimuli was most similar in size to a reference
stimulus. In experiments 2 and 3, we used methods previously used with autistic populations. In experiment 2,
children judged whether stimuli were the ‘same’ or ‘different’, and in experiment 3, we used a method-of-
adjustment task.
Results: Across all tasks, autistic children were equally susceptible to the Ebbinghaus illusion as typically developing
children. Autistic children showed a heightened susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion, but only in the method-of-
adjustment task. This result may reflect differences in decisional criteria.
Conclusions: Our results are inconsistent with theories proposing reduced contextual integration in autism and
suggest that previous reports of altered susceptibility to illusions may arise from differences in decision-making,
rather than differences in perception per se. Our findings help to elucidate the underlying reasons for atypical
responses to perceptual illusions in autism and call for the use of methods that reduce cognitive bias when
measuring illusion susceptibility.
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Background
Along with impaired social communication and inter-
action, autism is characterised by restricted, repetitive
patterns of behaviour and interests, including atypical
responses to sensory information (Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5)
[1]). Sensory symptoms are common in autistic indivi-
duals [2] and impact many aspects of everyday function-
ing, including behaviour in educational settings [3], daily
living skills [4] and family life [5]. Understanding atypical
sensory functioning in autism is therefore of critical
import.
Vision is perhaps the sensory modality that has been
most extensively studied in autistic individuals (see [6]
for review). The first study to use visual illusions to
characterise autistic perception was conducted by Happé
[7]. She selected six illusions purported to result from
the integration of features with their surrounding
context: the Ponzo illusion, Ebbinghaus illusion (or
Titchener’s circles), Kanisza triangle, Müller-Lyer illusion,
Hering illusion and Poggendorff illusion (see Table 1). The
illusions were displayed on cards, and participants were
asked to make simple judgments for each illusion (e.g.
Müller-Lyer: ‘are the lines the same size or different
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Table 1 Summary of previous studies assessing susceptibility to visual illusions in autistic individuals
Illusion and example Study Method Summary of group differences
in susceptibility
Ebbinghaus (or Titchener circles) Happé [7] Same/different AUT < CONa,b
Ropar and Mitchell [10] Method-of-adjustment AUT = CON
Ropar and Mitchell [10] Same/different AUT = CON
Ropar and Mitchell [12] Method-of-adjustment AUT ≈ CONc
Schwarzkopf et al. [16] Forced choice AUT = CON
Müller-Lyer Happé [7] Same/different AUT = CONa,b
Ropar and Mitchell [10] Method-of-adjustment AUT > CON
Ropar and Mitchell [10] Same/different AUT = CON
Ropar and Mitchell [12] Method-of-adjustment AUT = CON
Ishida et al. [13] Method-of-adjustment AUT = CON
Ponzo Happé [7] Same/different AUT < CONa,b
Ropar and Mitchell [10] Method-of-adjustment AUT = CON
Ropar and Mitchell [10] Same/different AUT = CON
Ropar and Mitchell [12] Method-of-adjustment AUT = CON
Ishida et al. [13] Method-of-adjustment AUT < CON
Illusory (Kanisza) figures Happé [7] “How many triangles?” AUT < CONa
Milne and Scope [15] Forced choice AUT = CON
Poggendorff Happé [7] “Which line joins up with which?” AUT < CONa,b
Hering Happé [7] “Are lines straight or curvy?” AUT < CONa,b
Horizontal-vertical (or Hat) Ropar and Mitchell [10] Method-of-adjustment AUT < CON
Ropar and Mitchell [10] Same/different AUT = CON
Ropar and Mitchell [12] Method-of-adjustment AUT < CON
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sizes?’; Ebbinghaus: ‘are the circles the same size or differ-
ent sizes?’). In the size illusions (Ebbinghaus, Müller-Lyer,
Ponzo), the sizes of the features were identical, so a ‘differ-
ent’ judgment was deemed to result from the inducing
context. Strikingly, Happé reported that young people on
the autism spectrum (aged 8–16 years, n = 25) were sus-
ceptible to fewer visual illusions than typically developing
children matched for mental age (n = 21) and children
with a learning difficulty matched for both mental age and
chronological age (n = 21). A smaller proportion of autistic
participants succumbed to each illusion compared to the
other groups, apart from in the case of the Müller-Lyer
illusion, in which case the majority of autistic individuals
were also ‘fooled’ by the illusion.
Attempts to reproduce Happé’s [7] findings have had
mixed success. Hoy, Hatton and Hare [8] presented the
same task used by Happé to younger autistic children,
aged 4–9 years (n = 17), and typically developing chil-
dren matched in age and verbal ability (n = 17), and
found no group differences in the number of illusions
that children with and without autism were susceptible
to. Yet, Bölte, Holtmann, Poustka, Scheurich and
Schmidt [9] reported reduced susceptibility to illusions
in autistic adults (n = 15) compared to that in typical
adults matched in non-verbal and verbal ability (n = 15)
using five variants of each of five illusions (Ebbinghaus,
Ponzo, Müller-Lyer, Poggendorff, Hering) in a task very
similar to that used by Happé.
Other studies have used the method-of-adjustment, in
which participants are asked to manipulate one stimulus
until it is perceptually identical to another stimulus. In
this task, participants do not need to give a verbal
response, and there is scope to assess the strength of an
illusory effect, rather than classifying responses as those
that either do or do not indicate susceptibility to an
illusion (cf. Happé [7]). Using this method, Ropar and
Mitchell [10] found that autistic children aged 7 to
18 years (n = 23) were just as affected by the Ponzo and
Ebbinghaus illusions as those from a range of compari-
son groups, including individuals with moderate learning
difficulties and typically developing children and adults.
Interestingly, however, the autistic children did not
succumb to the horizontal-vertical illusion [11] and
surprisingly showed heightened susceptibility to the
Müller-Lyer illusion. Ropar and Mitchell further showed
that there was no evidence of group differences in sus-
ceptibility to visual illusions when using a task modelled
on that of Happé [7]. Ropar and Mitchell largely repli-
cated their findings in a later study [12], demonstrating
again that autistic children did not generally demon-
strate a reduced susceptibility to illusions, apart from in
the case of the horizontal-vertical illusion. More re-
cently, Ishida, Kamio and Nakamizo [13] demonstrated
that young people on the autism spectrum aged 10 to
16 years (n = 9) were less susceptible to the Ponzo
illusion than typically developing children matched in
age and IQ (n = 9) but were equally susceptible to the
Müller-Lyer illusion. Furthermore, Mitchell, Mottron,
Soulières and Ropar [14] presented the Shepard’s table
illusion to young autistic people aged between 12 and
29 years (n = 18) and age- and ability-matched typically
developing participants (n = 18) and reported that while
autistic individuals were susceptible to the illusion, the
illusory effect was weaker than in the comparison group.
Finally, some studies have used forced-choice methods
to measure susceptibility to visual illusions in autism.
Milne and Scope [15] assessed susceptibility to illusory
‘Kanisza’ figures by asking participants to judge whether
a rectangle induced by surrounding shapes was ‘thin’
or ‘fat’. In this task, autistic children aged 7 to
13 years (n = 18) showed no differences in accuracy or re-
action time compared to non-autistic children with special
educational needs (n = 16) and typically developing chil-
dren (n = 20). More recently, Schwarzkopf, Anderson, de
Haas, White and Rees [16] used a forced-choice task using
the Ebbinghaus illusion, where participants were asked to
judge which stimulus was larger on each trial. In this task,
adults with Asperger’s syndrome (n = 15) were equally
susceptible to the illusion as neurotypical adults matched
in age and ability (n = 12).
Table 1 Summary of previous studies assessing susceptibility to visual illusions in autistic individuals (Continued)
Shepard’s tables Mitchell et al. [14] Method-of-adjustment AUT < CON
AUT autism group, CON control group
aIllusion used by Hoy, Hatton and Hare [8] but individual results for each illusion not reported
bIllusion used by Bölte et al. [9] but individual results for each illusion not reported
cIndividuals with Asperger’s syndrome and typically developing children aged 11 were less susceptible to the illusion than those with autism, typically developing
children aged 8 and children with moderate learning difficulties
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Our review of previous studies investigating visual illu-
sions in autism presents a complex picture (see Table 1
for summary, and [17] for meta-analysis). The same is
also true for studies assessing the relationship between
autistic traits and illusory perception in the general
population. Walter, Dassonville and Bochsler [18]
reported that individuals with higher scores on the
Systemizing Quotient [19] were less susceptible to some
illusions (the rod-and-frame, Roelofs, Ponzo and
Poggendorff illusions), but not others (induced motion,
Zollner, Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer). Meanwhile, sus-
ceptibility to illusions was not correlated with either
scores on the empathizing quotient [20] or the autism
spectrum quotient (AQ) [21]. Yet, Chouinard, Noulty,
Sperandio and Landry [22] later reported that higher
scores on the AQ were related to reduced susceptibility
to the Müller-Lyer illusion but not the Ebbinghaus
and Ponzo illusions. Chouinard, Unwin, Landry and
Speriando [23] later failed to replicate this result, in-
stead showing that only the Shepard’s table and
square-diamond illusions were correlated with AQ
scores, out of 13 illusions tested.
While it is clear that the evidence is mixed, those stud-
ies finding group differences between autistic individuals
and comparison groups have nevertheless been sug-
gested to reflect differences in autistic perception. For
example, Happé [7] proposed that autistic individuals
demonstrated reduced contextual integration, processing
features more independently from their surrounding
context than neurotypical individuals. This explanation
was tightly linked to the weak central coherence account
of autism [24, 25]. It has also been suggested that re-
duced susceptibility to some illusions may arise from
weaker top-down influences on autistic perception [14,
26]. These ideas were later elaborated in a theory of aut-
istic perception situated within a Bayesian framework
[27]. Pellicano and Burr [27] proposed that autistic indi-
viduals have attenuated (broader) priors, which means
that their perception is more influenced by incoming
sensory information, and is thus more veridical. Yet,
some illusions may lend themselves to Bayesian explana-
tions more easily than others [28]. For example, it is easy
to postulate a role for priors in the perception of the
Kanisza triangle and the hollow-face illusion, whereas il-
lusions arising from low-level sensory processing (e.g.
the Ebbinghaus illusion) may be unrelated to Bayesian
inference.
It is important to consider, however, whether reports
of reduced susceptibility to illusions in autism are really
due to differences in perception at all. All previous stud-
ies assessing visual illusions in autism have confounded
the observer’s sensitivity to an illusion with the ob-
server’s subjective criterion for reporting whether the
illusion was seen [29, 30]. Therefore, group differences
in responses to illusions may have arisen due to differ-
ences in subjective criteria—or decisional bias, without
necessitating underlying differences in perception: a pos-
sibility that is particularly likely when groups may differ
according to cognitive and affective factors [30].1 Indeed,
the problem of distinguishing a perceptual from a cogni-
tive bias is not confined to studies of autism, but applies
to all Type 2 psychophysical measures of bias [29] such
as visual after-effects [31, 32].
To circumvent this potential problem, Morgan et al.
[29] advocated the use of a two-alternative forced-choice
(2-AFC) procedure with a roving pedestal. Morgan et al.
demonstrated how this method could be applied to a
range of different perceptual phenomena. In the case of
the Ebbinghaus illusion, for example, previous studies
have asked autistic and non-autistic participants to de-
termine which of two central circles is bigger (Fig. 1a).
While a bias in responses could arise at the level of the
percept, it could also reflect the observer’s decisional cri-
terion (e.g. to respond that the circle surrounded by
large circles is smaller when the observer is unsure).
Such a criterion could be particularly affected by an ob-
server’s previous exposure to an illusion. In Morgan
et al.’s method, one reference stimulus of fixed size and
two comparison stimuli are presented sequentially
(Fig. 1b). One comparison stimulus (the standard) is a
pedestal, which has a central circle that is either larger
or smaller than that of the reference stimulus on a given
trial. The other comparison stimulus (the test) has a
central circle that is an increment larger than the pedes-
tal. The two comparison stimuli have the same sur-
rounding context circles, which differ from the context
of the reference. The observer is asked whether the cen-
tral circle of the first or second comparison is most simi-
lar in size to that of the reference. The order of
presentation of the standard and test is randomised and
the size of the pedestal (i.e. larger or smaller than the
reference) is randomly interleaved throughout the task.
Thus, in this task, participants cannot rely on strategies
such as choosing the standard if they are unsure (as they
do not know which stimulus is the standard on a given
trial) or choosing a stimulus with a certain context
(because they are required to choose between two
stimuli with identical contexts). Using this method in
conjunction with a signal detection theory framework
[33], it is possible to characterise the observer’s discrim-
ination sensitivity and the observer’s perceptual bias,
whilst minimising the influence of decisional biases.
Within this framework, an observer’s discrimination
sensitivity is limited by ‘internal noise’ [29], which refers
to any source of variability that limits performance.
Differences in perceptual bias between conditions of a
task (e.g. small or large context circles in the Ebbinghaus
stimulus) reflect illusion susceptibility.
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Given this recent methodological advance in measur-
ing illusion susceptibility, it seems timely to revisit the
question of whether autistic individuals show reduced
susceptibility to illusions. In this study, we measured
susceptibility to two well-characterised contextual illu-
sions: the Ebbinghaus illusion and the Müller-Lyer
illusion, in autistic and typically developing children. In
experiment 1, we used Morgan et al.’s [29] method to
minimise the effects of higher-level decision-making strat-
egies, in order to measure perceptual biases as purely as
possible. To allow comparison with previous studies, we
used more conventional methods in experiments 2 and 3.
Experiment 2 used a similar task to that used by Happé
[7] and experiment 3 used a method-of-adjustment task
comparable to that used by Ropar and Mitchell [12].
The Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer illusions are two of
the most frequently used illusions with autistic popula-
tions to date (see Table 1) and have led to mixed results.
Our study allowed us to investigate whether such mixed
results could be attributable to methodological differ-
ences. The use of these illusions in conjunction was also
informative because they are both size illusions arising
from the surrounding context. Reduced contextual inte-
gration could in theory lead to reduced susceptibility for
both illusions, as has been shown in the case of the
Ebbinghaus illusion [7]. Yet, a distinction can be drawn
between the two illusions. In the Müller-Lyer illusion,
the inducing context (i.e. the fins) touches the stimulus
on which judgments are made—which is not the case
with the Ebbinghaus illusion. This difference may
mean that the context has a greater or more auto-
matic influence on perception for the Müller-Lyer
illusion, making autistic children more susceptible to
this illusion in particular [7]. The use of these
illusions together therefore allows us to characterise
the nature of atypical integration of context in autistic
individuals. Critically, in this experiment, we examine
whether any differences in illusory perception between
autistic children and typically developing children can
be revealed when using rigorous methods to minimise
the influence of cognitive bias.
Methods
General procedure
This study measured susceptibility to Ebbinghaus and
Müller-Lyer illusions in autistic and typically developing
children using three methods: one specifically designed
to minimise cognitive biases (experiment 1) and two to
allow comparison with previous studies (experiments 2
and 3). Children were tested individually in a quiet room
as part of a wider battery of tasks within sessions of a
public engagement of science event. Computer tasks
were presented with a viewing distance of 50 cm. When
children completed more than one experiment, the ex-
periments were presented sequentially (i.e. experiment 1
was followed by experiment 2 and then experiment 3).
Participants
Autistic and typically developing children aged 6 to
14 years were recruited from schools and community
contacts in the Greater London area. Autistic children had
previously received an independent clinical diagnosis of
an autism spectrum condition according to International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) [34] or DSM-IV [35]
criteria. Typically developing children had no diagnosed
developmental conditions, as reported by parents. Parents
completed the Social Communication Questionnaire
(SCQ) [36], and autistic children were administered the
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-2nd edition
(ADOS-2) [37]. All autistic children scored above thresh-
old for an autism spectrum condition on one or both mea-
sures, and no typically developing child scored above the
threshold on the SCQ (score of 15; [36]). All children were
cognitively able (IQ > 70), as assessed by the Wechsler
Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence, Second Edition
(WASI-II) [38]. Further details on the participants in-
cluded in each experiment are provided below.
Fig. 1 Methods for assessing the Ebbinghaus illusion. a Traditional method, where participants are asked whether the two stimuli have central
circles that are the same size or not, and/or to judge which stimulus has the largest central circle. In this example, the central circles are identical
in size. b Two-alternative-forced-choice method as described by Morgan et al. [29]. Participants are asked which of two sequentially presented
comparison stimuli (the standard or test) has a central circle that is most similar in size to that presented in the reference. In this example, the
central circle in the standard is 5% smaller than in the reference and the test is 4% larger than the standard
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Apparatus and stimuli
Computer tasks (experiments 1 and 3) were presented
on a Dell Precision laptop (1366 × 768 pixels, 60 Hz)
using MATLAB and elements of the Psychophysics
Toolbox [39–41]. White stimuli were presented on a
mid-grey background, at 61% Weber contrast.
Experiment 1: 2-AFC roving pedestal
Participants
The dataset for the Ebbinghaus analysis included 29 aut-
istic children (4 females) and 33 typically developing
children (12 females). The groups did not differ signifi-
cantly in age, t(60) = 1.49, p = .14, or non-verbal ability,
t(60) = .41, p = .69, although the autistic children had
lower verbal IQ scores, t(40.53) = 2.93, p = .006 (see
Table 2 for scores). The dataset for the Müller-Lyer
analysis included 33 autistic children (4 females) and 47
typically developing children (18 females). The groups
did not differ significantly in age, t(78) = 1.36, p = .18, or
non-verbal ability, t(78) = .33, p = .74, but differed in ver-
bal ability, t(78) = 4.55, p < .001 (see Table 2 for scores).
Twenty-one autistic children and 11 typically developing
children were in the datasets for both the Ebbinghaus
and Müller-Lyer versions of the experiment.
An additional five autistic children and two typically de-
veloping children were excluded from the Ebbinghaus
analysis, and an additional four autistic children and one
typically developing child were excluded from the Müller-
Lyer analysis due to poor-fitting psychometric functions
(see “Data screening and analysis” section). A further four
of the youngest typically developing children were re-
moved from each of the Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer
datasets to ensure the groups matched adequately in age.
Stimuli
The reference stimulus was centred horizontally, at the
top of the screen. The comparison stimuli were
positioned below the reference stimulus, to form a triad
(see Fig. 2). In the Ebbinghaus task, the diameter of the
central circle of the reference stimulus was fixed at
1.25°. The stimuli were either surrounded by eight small
context circles with a diameter of .42° and positioned
1.25° from the centre of the stimulus or by four large
context circles with a diameter of 1.67°, positioned 2.08°
from the centre of the stimulus. In the Müller-Lyer task,
the reference stimulus had a horizontal line that was 3°
in length. Fins were 1° long, attached to the end of the
horizontal line at an angle of 45° (either inward or
outward).
Procedure
The task was based on the Ebbinghaus task devised by
Morgan et al. [29], with three main modifications to
make it suitable for child participants. First, the task was
presented within the context of a developmentally
appropriate trading game. Second, to minimise memory
demands, the reference stimulus was always present on
the screen, and the comparison stimuli were presented
simultaneously (cf. [29]). Third, to reduce the number of
trials, we omitted the context-free condition.
The reference stimulus was presented continuously on
the screen. The experimenter initiated each trial with a
keypress, triggering the presentation of comparison
stimuli for a duration of 1000 ms. In the Ebbinghaus
version of the experiment, children were asked to iden-
tify which of the two comparison stimuli had a central
circle most similar in size to that of the reference
Table 2 Characteristics of participants for each task in experiment 1
Ebbinghaus Müller-Lyer
Characteristic Autistic Typically developing Autistic Typically developing
N 29 33 33 47
Age 10.09 (2.06) 9.33 (1.95) 10.46 (2.00) 9.86 (1.95)
6.27–14.28 6.63–13.47 7.41–14.28 6.18–13.75
PIQ 101.66 (16.70) 103.27 (14.70) 100.48 (14.28) 101.53 (13.29)
75–141 78–131 75–128 74–131
VIQ 98.28 (17.22) 108.67 (8.82) 97.48 (14.22) 110.60 (11.49)
71–130 91–132 73–126 77–135
FSIQ 99.69 (16.02) 106.85 (10.96) 98.67 (12.59) 107.13 (11.39)
73–129 90–131 76–119 81–131
SCQ 22.62 (6.57) 4.63 (3.19) 22.55 (6.68) 3.90 (3.25)
5–33 0–12 5–35 0–13
ADOS total 11.37 (5.49) 10.60 (4.83)
2–22 2–22
Mean (SD) range. IQ scores were assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (WASI-II) [38]
SCQ Social Communication Questionnaire [36], ADOS Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-2 [37], VIQ verbal IQ, PIQ performance IQ, FSIQ full-scale IQ
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stimulus. In the Müller-Lyer version of the experiment,
children were asked to identify which of the two compari-
son stimuli had a horizontal line most similar in size to
that of the reference stimulus. Before completing the ex-
perimental trials, the task was explained to participants
with four context-free demonstration trials (Fig. 2a) and
four demonstration trials with context. Participants were
also shown examples of stimuli on cards where necessary.
Children were told that they were trading shapes in
‘The Bank of Geometrica’. The reference stimulus was
the ‘most valuable shape’ in the game, and participants
had to choose which of the two comparison stimuli was
the most similar in size to this stimulus. Participants
were told that they would be able to trade the shapes
that they had chosen for points. Throughout the session,
children made their responses verbally (left/right) or by
pointing, and the experimenter entered their responses
using a keyboard. No specific feedback on performance
was given although general encouragement was provided
throughout.
The participants completed the task in two context
conditions, which were presented sequentially in a coun-
terbalanced order. In one condition of the Ebbinghaus
task (S-L; Fig. 2b), the reference stimulus had small con-
text circles and the comparison stimuli had large context
circles; in the other condition (L-S; Fig. 2c), the reference
stimulus had large context circles and the comparison
stimuli had small context circles. In the Müller-Lyer
task, one condition (O-I; Fig. 2b) had outward fins on
the reference and inward fins on the comparison stimuli,
and the other condition (I-O; Fig. 2c) had inward fins on
the reference and outward fins on the comparison stim-
uli. One comparison stimulus was a standard, and the
other comparison stimulus was a test.
For each context condition, participants completed 40
trials in which the standard was a pedestal below the
reference, and 40 trials in which the standard was a ped-
estal above the reference. In the Ebbinghaus task, the
central circle of the standard was either −5 or +5% of
the diameter of that in the reference stimulus (i.e. 1.19°
or 1.31°). In the Müller-Lyer task, the length of the hori-
zontal line in the standard was either −20 or +20% of
the length of that in the reference stimulus (i.e. 2.4° or
3.6°).2 The pedestals were randomly interleaved through-
out the task (i.e. a ‘roving pedestal’; [29, 42]). The loca-
tion of the standard stimulus (left or right) was
randomised on each trial. The size of the test stimulus
was guided by method of constant stimuli, with eight
trials presented at five different levels for each pedestal
(+1, +2, +4, +8, +16% of the diameter or length of the
standard for the Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer experi-
ments, respectively). These trials were presented in a
randomised order.
The 80 trials for each context condition were divided
into blocks of 20 trials. After each block, participants
were shown a cartoon cash register which calculated the
‘points’ they had obtained. These points were randomly
allocated but provided motivation for children through-
out the task. Each context condition took approximately
5 min.
Data screening and analysis
The psychophysical task is a comparison-of-comparisons
task [42]. Using a signal detection theory approach [33],
the standard (S) and test (T) stimuli can each be de-
scribed by normal distributions with mean values corre-
sponding to the physical size of the stimulus (p, p + t)
plus perceptual bias (μ) and variances (σ2) corresponding
to performance-limiting internal noise [42]:
S eN pþ μ; σ2=2ð Þ
T eN pþ t þ μ; σ2=2ð Þ
Thus, the probability of choosing the standard can be
calculated as:
P Sð Þ ¼ P Sj j < Tj jð Þ ¼ P S2=T2 < 1 
where S2/T2 is a random variable with a doubly non-
central F distribution [42].
Fig. 2 Schematic representation of stimuli used in experiment 1.
a Context-free practice trial. b S-L context condition in Ebbinghaus
task and O-I context condition in Müller-Lyer task. c L-S context
condition in Ebbinghaus task and I-O in Müller-Lyer task. In all
examples, the reference stimulus is presented at the top and the
two comparison stimuli are presented below. In these examples, the
left comparison stimulus is the standard (pedestal) and the right
comparison stimulus is the test
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Maximum likelihood psychometric functions were fit
to each participant’s data, for each combination of ped-
estal and context condition, assuming constant internal
noise across conditions, but allowing bias to vary across
the context conditions. Figure 3 shows psychometric
functions for a typically developing child. In the S-L
condition, the central circle of the reference stimulus
tends to appear bigger than the central circles of the
comparison stimuli. Thus, as the test is made larger than
the pedestal in the negative pedestal trials (−5%), the
participant becomes less likely to choose the standard
(or pedestal), as s/he perceives the larger comparison
stimulus (i.e. the test) to be most similar in size to the
reference stimulus. In the positive pedestal condition,
the participant may become more likely to choose the
test as it increases in size, until it exceeds a limit at
which the pedestal starts to look more similar in size to
the reference stimulus. In the L-S condition, the central
circle of the reference stimulus tends to appear smaller
than the central circles of the comparison stimuli. Thus,
as the test is made larger than the standard, the partici-
pant becomes more likely to choose the standard as it is
the smallest stimulus. Thus, a negative bias is expected
in condition S-L, and a positive bias is expected in
condition L-S. The same logic can be applied to the
Müller-Lyer illusion, whereby a negative bias is expected
in condition O-I and a positive bias in condition I-O.
Assuming that the different context conditions are
associated with the same value of internal noise, but
different values of bias, we obtained one internal noise
(σ) and two bias (μ) parameters, taking into account the
pedestal value and fitted context bias for each
observation [29, 42]. Internal noise and bias are
expressed as Weber fractions with respect to the size of
the reference stimulus (%).
We screened the data for poorly fitting psychometric
functions and removed datasets where the likelihood of
the fit was particularly low (log likelihood <−110) and/or
the internal noise value was 30 or above such as to make
the slope of the psychometric function essentially flat.
Such functions suggested that participants were not suc-
cessfully discriminating between stimuli, which may have
been due to inattentiveness or a lack of task understand-
ing. Five autistic children and two typically developing
children were removed from the Ebbinghaus analysis,
and four autistic children and one typically developing
child were removed from the Müller-Lyer analysis on
this basis.
To quantify the extent of bias associated with each
illusion, we calculated the difference in bias between the
two context conditions (i.e. BiasL-S − BiasS-L or BiasI-O −
BiasO-I for the Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer tasks, respect-
ively). Internal noise values were log-transformed to min-
imise the effects of skewness and kurtosis.
Outliers—defined as points lying 3 or more standard devi-
ations from the group mean—were replaced with points
lying 2.5 standard deviations from the group mean [43].
Two outliers were identified in the bias values for the
Ebbinghaus task (autistic n = 1; typically developing n = 1),
and a further two were identified in the bias values
for the Müller-Lyer task (autistic n = 1; typically de-
veloping n = 1), which were replaced with trimmed
values. Note that the same pattern of results was
obtained without outlier replacement (see Additional
Fig. 3 Example dataset for the Ebbinghaus task. Maximum likelihood fits to the data for an 11-year-old typically developing child in the Ebbinghaus
task, including two pedestal values (−5, +5%) and two context conditions (S-L: where the reference stimulus has small context circles and the
comparison stimuli have large context circles, and L-S: where the reference has large context circles and the comparison stimuli have small context
circles). The red and green lines represent fits to the data where internal noise (σ) is constant across context conditions, but bias (μ) is free to vary. The
black line represents the fit of a single model where bias and internal noise are both held constant across the context conditions
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file 1). Shapiro-Wilks tests showed that the distribu-
tion of log-transformed internal noise values did not
differ significantly from a normal distribution, in ei-
ther task (ps ≥ .53). However, the bias values deviated
from normality in both tasks (ps < .001). We therefore
supplemented our analyses on these variables with boot-
strapped analyses with 1000 samples, and bias-corrected
95% confidence intervals to ensure our results were robust
to deviations from normality.
Results and discussion
The values of internal noise and perceptual bias in
autistic and typically developing children are shown
in Fig. 4. The average bias associated with the
Müller-Lyer illusion (autistic: M = 73.97, SD = 47.51;
typically developing: M = 83.51, SD = 79.79) was
greater than that associated with the Ebbinghaus
illusion (autistic: M = 42.63, SD = 39.07; typically de-
veloping: M = 55.84, SD = 55.91), although there was
considerable individual variability. There was no sig-
nificant difference in the extent of bias displayed by
autistic children and typically developing children in
the Ebbinghaus task, t(60) = 1.06, p = .29 (bootstrapped
95% CI for mean difference: [−38.11, 9.61]; p = .29), and
no significant group difference in internal noise estimates,
t(60) = 1.17, p = .25 (autistic: M = .90, SD = .18; typically
developing: M = .95, SD = .21). Likewise, the groups did
not differ significantly in terms of bias, t(78) = .61, p = .54
(bootstrapped 95% CI for mean difference: [−38.17,
19.42]; p = .52), or internal noise, t(78) = .78, p = .44
(autistic: M = .94, SD = .19; typically developing: M = .91,
SD = .15), in the Müller-Lyer experiment.
We conducted correlational analyses to investigate
whether participant characteristics contributed to
differences between participants. Internal noise in the
Ebbinghaus experiment was negatively related to age
[r = −.40, p = .001], with older children having lower
levels of internal noise. Internal noise in the Müller-Lyer
experiment was negatively related to both verbal IQ
[r = −.27, p = .02] and non-verbal IQ [r = −.24, p = .03],
with higher internal noise values associated with lower
ability. To ensure that group differences in verbal IQ were
not contributing to the results, we confirmed that there
was no significant group difference in internal noise in the
Müller-Lyer task whilst covarying the effect of verbal abil-
ity, F(1,77) = .12, p = .73. All other correlations between
task measures and age and ability were non-significant,
ps ≥ .11.
To ensure that the non-significant difference in bias
between autistic and typically developing children could
not be accounted for by data insensitivity [44, 45], we
quantified the relative evidence for the null and alternative
hypotheses using the Bayesian independent t tests with a
default Cauchy prior width of 1, implemented using JASP
software [46]. The Bayes factors (BF) resulting from these
tests reflect a continuum of evidence favouring the null
and alternative hypotheses, with BF < 1/3 providing
substantial evidence for the null hypothesis and BF > 3
providing substantial evidence for the alternative hypoth-
esis [47]. The results confirmed that there was substantial
evidence in support of the null hypothesis of no group
Fig. 4 Internal noise and bias estimates for autistic children and typically developing children in experiment 1. Individual data points (small crosses)
and group means (large crosses) are shown for Ebbinghaus stimuli (left panel) and Müller-Lyer stimuli (right panel). Distributions smoothed with kernel
density functions are shown in red (autistic children) and green (typically developing children). Data are presented with outliers trimmed
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differences in bias in both the Ebbinghaus (BF = .32) and
Müller-Lyer (BF = .21) experiments. Robustness checks
assessing the influence of the choice of prior are provided
in Additional file 2.
These results show that autistic children do not show
altered susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer
illusions when using a novel method that minimises
decision bias. For comparison, we next measured sus-
ceptibility to the same illusions using more traditional
methods. In experiment 2, we revisited the paradigm
used by Happé [7].
Experiment 2: same-different responses
Participants
In the Ebbinghaus task, the dataset included 21 children
in the autistic group (2 females) and 28 children in the
typically developing group (11 females), with no
differences between the groups in terms of age, t(47)
= .93, p = .36, non-verbal ability, t(31.38) = 1.37, p = .18,
or verbal ability, t(47) = 1.75, p = .09 (see Table 3 for
scores). In the dataset for the Müller-Lyer task, there
were 24 autistic children (1 female) and 42 typically
developing children (15 females), matched in age,
t(64) = 1.20, p = .23, and non-verbal ability, t(32.23) = .23,
p = .82, but not in verbal ability, t(64) = 4.01, p < .001 (see
Table 3 for scores). Seventeen autistic children and 19 typ-
ically developing children were included in the datasets
for both versions of the experiment. Twelve autistic
children and four typically developing children in the
Ebbinghaus dataset were also included in the Ebbinghaus
dataset in experiment 1, and 17 autistic children and
26 typically developing children included in the
Müller-Lyer dataset were also in the Müller-Lyer
dataset in experiment 1. A further two autistic children
and 14 typically developing children were excluded
from analysis in the Ebbinghaus task, and an add-
itional five autistic children and 20 typically develop-
ing children were excluded from the analysis in the
Müller-Lyer task because they incorrectly responded
that the control stimuli differed in size.
Stimuli
Stimuli were presented on A4 laminated cards, with
three cards for each of the Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer
illusions. The stimuli were presented in white on a mid-
grey background, as in experiment 1. For each illusion,
there was a context-free condition, where two circles
(diameter .9 cm) or two horizontal lines (length 2.1 cm)
were presented side-by-side for the Ebbinghaus and
Müller-Lyer tasks, respectively. There were also two
cards for each illusion that had the same stimuli with
added context. For the Ebbinghaus illusion, one card
had four large context circles (diameter 1.1 cm) on the
left and eight small context circles (diameter .3) on the
right, and the other card had small context circles on
the left and large context circles on the right. For the
Müller-Lyer illusion, one card had inward fins on the left
and outward fins on the right, and the other card had
outward fins on the left and inward fins on the right.
The fins were .7 cm in length and were oriented at 45°
as in experiment 1. The central circles and horizontal
lines were always the same size. The relative sizes and
configurations of the context circles and fins were the
same as in experiment 1.
Table 3 Characteristics of participants for each task in experiment 2
Ebbinghaus Müller-Lyer
Characteristic Autistic Typically developing Autistic Typically developing
N 21 28 24 42
Age 9.88 (1.97) 9.34 (2.05) 9.94 (1.96) 9.32 (2.05)
7.38–14.73 6.09–13.86 7.38–14.73 6.09–13.86
PIQ 108.14 (20.53) 101.18 (12.80) 103.96 (20.89) 102.88 (12.25)
75–141 75–131 75–141 75–131
VIQ 100.95 (16.87) 108.68 (14.05) 97.58 (15.04) 112.62 (14.45)
73–130 77–130 73–126 77–149
FSIQ 105.00 (17.27) 105.96 (12.79) 100.71 (16.34) 109.07 (12.73)
73–129 78–131 73–129 78–135
SCQ 22.32 (6.91) 3.67 (3.10) 21.68 (6.50) 3.59 (3.24)
8–38 0–12 11–33 0–13
ADOS total 11.75 (4.62) 11.96 (4.54)
3–21 7–21
Mean (SD) range. IQ scores were assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (WASI-II) [38]
SCQ Social Communication Questionnaire [36], ADOS Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-2 [37], VIQ verbal IQ, PIQ performance IQ, FSIQ full-scale IQ
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Procedure
The cards were shuffled to randomise the order of pres-
entation, and the experimenter held up one card at a
time. Following Happé [7], children were either asked
‘Are the [circles/lines] the same size or different sizes?’
or ‘Are the [circles/lines] different sizes or the same
size?’. The question order was counterbalanced across
participants. If children responded ‘different’, they were
asked to identify which was bigger. Children were pre-
vented from touching the cards while making their
judgments.
Data screening and analysis
Following Happé [7], participants were only included in
the analysis if they correctly responded that the circles/
lines were the same size in the context-free condition.
We then counted the number of cards displaying con-
text for which participants gave the expected incorrect
judgment, yielding a score ranging from 0 to 2 for each
illusion.
Results and discussion
Out of 21 autistic children, 13 (61.9%) succumbed to the
Ebbinghaus illusion on both trials, 6 (28.6%) succumbed
to the Ebbinghaus illusion on one trial only and 2 (9.5%)
did not succumb to the illusion on either trial (Fig. 5).
Out of 28 typically developing children, 12 (42.9%) suc-
cumbed to the Ebbinghaus illusion on both trials, 8
(28.6%) succumbed to the illusion on one trial only and
8 (28.6%) did not succumb to the illusion at all. Chi-
squared analysis (with Yates correction) revealed no sig-
nificant differences between the groups in the number of
children who never succumbed to the illusion and the
number of children who succumbed to the illusion in
one or more trial, χ2(1) = 1.64, p = .20. Logistic regression
revealed that age and ability were not significant predic-
tors of whether children succumbed to the illusion or
not, ps ≥ .16.
In the Müller-Lyer task, 22 out of 24 autistic children
(91.7%) succumbed to the illusion on both trials, while
the remaining two children did not succumb to the
illusion on either trial (8.3%). Thirty-nine out of 42 typ-
ically developing children (92.9%) succumbed to the
illusion on both trials, 2 (4.76%) succumbed to the
illusion on one trial and 1 did not succumb to the
illusion on either trial (2.38%). The proportions of par-
ticipants who succumbed to the illusion on one or more
trials compared to those who never succumbed to the
illusion did not differ between the autistic children and
typically developing children, χ2(1) = .25, p = .62 (with
Yates correction). Age and ability did not significantly
predict susceptibility in a logistic regression (ps ≥ .08).
Bayesian contingency tables with independent multi-
nomial sampling and a prior concentration of 1 imple-
mented in JASP software [46, 48] were also used to
compare group differences in the number of children
who succumbed to the illusion on no trials, one trial or
both trials. The null hypothesis is that there is independ-
ence between groups and responses, and the alternative
hypothesis is that there is an association between the
groups and responses. The results revealed substantial
evidence for the null hypothesis in the Müller-Lyer ex-
periment (BF = .07) but inconclusive evidence for either
the null or alternative hypothesis in the Ebbinghaus task
(BF = .64). Therefore, the data were insensitive to group
differences in the Ebbinghaus task and larger samples
would be required to conclusively determine whether
the groups differ in this task. Robustness checks showing
the influence of prior concentration can be found in
Additional file 2.
In sum, it appears that a similar proportion of autistic
children are susceptible to the Ebbinghaus and Müller-
Lyer illusions as typically developing children in this sim-
ple judgment task, although more data is required in the
Ebbinghaus task. In line with the results from experiment
1, a greater proportion of children were susceptible to the
Fig. 5 Proportions of autistic and typically developing (TD) children succumbing to the Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer illusions in neither, one or
both trials, in experiment 2
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Müller-Lyer illusion compared to the Ebbinghaus illusion,
suggesting that it is a more compelling illusion for both
autistic and typically developing children. As in experi-
ment 1, there was no difference between groups, even for
a measure which is contaminated by decision bias. How-
ever, these binary judgments (same/different) may not be
sufficiently fine-grained to reveal subtle group differences.
Indeed, it is possible that the majority of autistic children
experience the illusions, but the strength of their effects
may differ from that experienced by typically developing
children. In experiment 3, we therefore used the method-
of-adjustment.
Experiment 3: method-of-adjustment
Participants
Nineteen autistic children (1 female) and 38 typically de-
veloping children (15 females) completed the Ebbinghaus
method-of-adjustment task. The groups were comparable
in terms of age, t(55) = 1.13, p = .26, non-verbal ability,
t(27.04) = 1.03, p = .31, and verbal ability, t(55) = 1.59,
p = .12 (see Table 4 for scores). Twenty-four autistic
children (1 female) and 58 typically developing chil-
dren (20 females) completed the Müller-Lyer method-
of-adjustment task. The groups of autistic children
and typically developing children were matched in
terms of age, t(80) = .75, p = .46, and non-verbal ability,
t(30.48) = .29, p = .78, but the autistic children had lower
verbal IQs than typically developing children, t(80) = 4.02,
p < .001 (see Table 4 for scores). Seventeen of the autistic
children and 36 of the typically developing children partic-
ipated in both the Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer versions
of the experiment.
In the Ebbinghaus dataset, 16 autistic children and
27 typically developing children were included in the
Ebbinghaus dataset in experiment 2, and 11 autistic
children and eight typically developing children were in-
cluded in the Ebbinghaus dataset in experiment 1. In the
Müller-Lyer dataset, 20 autistic children and 39 typically
developing children were also included in the Müller-Lyer
dataset in experiment 2, and 15 autistic children and 39
typically developing children were included in the Müller-
Lyer dataset in experiment 1.
Stimuli
Two stimuli were presented side-by-side on the screen,
in the same configuration as in experiment 2. In the
Ebbinghaus task, one stimulus had small context circles,
and one stimulus had large context circles. In the
Müller-Lyer experiment, one stimulus had inward fins
and one stimulus had outward fins. The context loca-
tions (i.e. whether the small context circles or inward
fins were on the left or right) were counterbalanced
among participants. The sizes of the context circles and
fins were the same as in experiment 1. One stimulus was
a reference stimulus, with the same dimensions as in
experiment 1. The other was a comparison, in which the
initial diameter of the central circle or length of the
horizontal line was randomised between .68° and 1.82°
or 2.43° and 3.86°, respectively.
Procedure
Children were asked to adjust the size of the comparison
stimulus to match the size of the reference stimulus.
The location of the comparison stimulus was signalled
with a small green rectangle for 1000 ms before the
Table 4 Characteristics of participants for each task in experiment 3
Ebbinghaus Müller-Lyer
Characteristic Autistic Typically developing Autistic Typically developing
N 19 38 24 58
Age 10.06 (1.97) 9.44 (1.95) 9.93 (2.11) 9.56 (12.76)
7.41–14.73 6.09–13.86 7.38–14.73 74–131
PIQ 106.32 (18.42) 101.47 (12.84) 103.08 (20.72) 101.78 (12.76)
76–141 75–131 75–141 74–131
VIQ 102.21 (16.18) 108.61 (13.31) 98.38 (13.97) 111.64 (13.44)
73–130 77–135 73–126 77–149
FSIQ 104.74 (15.74) 105.97 (11.93) 100.67 (15.97) 107.84 (12.22)
77–129 78–131 73–129 78–135
SCQ 22.83 (6.26) 3.97 (2.99) 22.22 (7.25) 3.62 (3.22)
13–38 0–12 11–38 0–13
ADOS total 10.56 (4.73) 11.22 (5.01)
3–21 3–21
Mean (SD) range. IQ scores were assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (WASI-II) [38]
SCQ Social Communication Questionnaire [36], ADOS Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-2 [37], VIQ verbal IQ, PIQ performance IQ, FSIQ full-scale IQ
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stimuli appeared. Children used up and down arrow keys
to make the comparison stimulus bigger or smaller,
respectively, and pressed the space bar when they were
satisfied that the two stimuli were the same size. There
was no time limit. The task was presented in the context
of a factory, ‘GeoFactory’, in which children were asked
to make a shape that was the same as the one in the
catalogue (i.e. the reference stimulus).
Children were initially presented with a practice trial
with a star shape, to familiarise them with the task and
the response keys. Next, eight experimental trials were
presented. Four trials were context-free (i.e. without
context circles or fins), and four trials had context.
We counterbalanced across participants whether the
context-free or context trials were presented first. The
locations of the reference and comparison stimulus
(left/right) were varied across trials. In the Ebbinghaus
task, there were two trials where the reference stimulus
was surrounded by small context circles and two trials
where the reference stimulus was surrounded by large
context circles, and in the Müller-Lyer task, there were
two trials where the reference stimulus was flanked by
outward fins and two trials where it was flanked by
inward fins. We refer to these conditions as S-L and L-S
and O-I and I-O, respectively, for comparison with ex-
periment 1. The order of trials was randomised.
Data screening and analysis
We computed the difference between the size of the ad-
justed comparison stimulus and the reference stimulus,
as a proportion of the size of the reference stimulus, in
context-free and context trials, before taking an average
of the context-free trials and the trials in each context
condition (S-L and L-S in the Ebbinghaus task and O-I
and I-O in the Muller-Lyer task). As in experiment 1, a
single value of bias was computed by calculating the
difference between the two context conditions. As in ex-
periment 1, points lying 3 or more standard deviations
away from the group mean were replaced with those
lying 2.5 standard deviations from the mean. There were
no outliers in the Ebbinghaus task. One outlying value
was found (an autistic child) for the Müller-Lyer task
(context-free condition). Note that the same pattern of
results was obtained when this outlying value was
retained without replacement (Additional file 1).
We also recorded response time and the number of key-
presses between the stimulus onset and children pressing
the space bar to indicate they had completed the trial.
These values were log-transformed to minimise the effects
of negative skew and subjected to outlier screening,
although no outliers were found. Shapiro-Wilks tests
showed that the distribution of context-free size judg-
ments in the Ebbinghaus task and the bias values in the
Müller-Lyer experiment did not differ significantly from a
normal distribution (p = .06 and p = .25, respectively).
However, the bias values in the Ebbinghaus task and the
context-free judgments in the Müller-Lyer task did deviate
from normality (p = .007 and p < .001, respectively).
Where the assumption of normality was violated, we con-
ducted bootstrapped analyses as in experiment 1.
Results and discussion
Individual and group results for context-free size judg-
ments and bias estimates are shown in Fig. 6. First, we
assessed group differences in the Ebbinghaus task. On
average, the autistic children made the comparison
stimulus slightly smaller than the reference stimulus in
the context-free condition of the Ebbinghaus task, and
the typically developing children made it slightly larger.
However, the confidence intervals spanned 0 in both
groups, suggesting that their perception was largely
accurate (autistic: M = −.30, SD = 4.51, 95% CI = [−2.47,
1.87]; typically developing: M = .34, SD = 3.40, 95% CI
= [−.77, 1.46]). Moreover, the groups did not differ sig-
nificantly in their judgments, t(55) = .60, p = .55 (autistic:
M = 25.29, SD = 21.24; typically developing: M = 26.53,
SD = 12.08). Next, we compared the bias associated with
the context in the Ebbinghaus illusion and found that
the groups did not differ significantly, t(55) = .28, p = .78
(bootstrapped 95% CI for mean difference: [−12.56,
9.34], p = .83). Neither the bias nor the context-free size
judgment was significantly related to age and verbal or
non-verbal IQ, ps ≥ .53.
In contrast, the groups differed in their responses
to context-free trials in the Müller-Lyer task, t(80) =
2.78, p = .007, d = .63 (bootstrapped 95% CI for mean
difference: [.89, 4.99], p = .02). The autistic children
had a tendency to make the comparison larger than
the reference (M = 2.44, SD = 5.13, 95% CI = [.28, 4.61]),
whereas the typically developing children were more ac-
curate (M = −.39, SD = 3.75, 95% CI = [−1.37, .61]). There
were also differences in the extent of bias in the context
trials, with the autistic children showing a larger bias
(M = 51.03, SD = 19.70) than typically developing
children (M = 40.44, SD = 16.64), t(80) = 2.48, p = .015,
d = .58. Neither the context-free judgments nor the
bias values were significantly related to age and verbal
or non-verbal ability (ps ≥ .06). As in experiment 1,
the Müller-Lyer illusion was associated with a greater
level of bias than the Ebbinghaus task, overall.
Next, we investigated group differences in response
times and numbers of keypresses (Table 5). There were
no significant group differences in response times in
either the Ebbinghaus or Müller-Lyer tasks, and no in-
teractions between group and context condition (con-
text-free, context), ps ≥ .16. Thus, response times were
not analysed further. We then investigated the number
of keypresses. In the Ebbinghaus task, a mixed ANOVA
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with group as a between-participants factor and context
condition as a within-participants factor showed no sig-
nificant effect of group nor interaction between group
and condition in the number of keypresses (ps ≥ .13).
However, in the Müller-Lyer task, the autistic children
used significantly more keypresses than typically devel-
oping children in the Müller-Lyer task, F(1,80) = 14.11,
p < .001, ɳp
2 = .15. The effect of group did not interact
with context condition (p = .88). In the Müller-Lyer task,
the number of keypresses in the context-free condition
was significantly correlated with the corresponding size
judgment, r(80) = .32, p = .003, and the number of key-
presses in the context condition was significantly corre-
lated with the extent of bias, r(80) = .67, p < .001,
suggesting that increased keypresses reflect size judge-
ments in this task.
As in the other experiments, we complemented our
analysis of differences in bias with Bayesian statistics. In
line with the results of our frequentist statistics, we found
substantial evidence in support of the null hypothesis of
no group differences in bias in the Ebbinghaus task
(BF = .22). While there was relatively more evidence
in favour of the alternative hypothesis in the Müller-
Lyer task (BF = 2.87), this only constituted weak/anec-
dotal evidence, suggesting that more data is required
to provide strong evidence. Robustness checks for these
Bayesian t tests are provided in Additional file 2.
General discussion
In this study, we used three methods to characterise re-
sponses to Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer illusions in chil-
dren on the autism spectrum and typically developing
children. The first of these methods was designed to re-
duce the influence of decision biases on judgments,
whereas the other two were methods that have been
used previously with autistic populations and which may
be contaminated by decision biases. Across all methods,
the Müller-Lyer illusion had stronger effects on re-
sponses compared to the Ebbinghaus illusion. However,
we were particularly interested in comparing the
Table 5 Means and standard deviations of response times (RT) in seconds and number of presses before making a decision in the
context-free and context trials of the Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer tasks in experiment 3, for autistic and typically developing children
Ebbinghaus Müller-Lyer
Group Context-free Context Context-free Context
RT Presses RT Presses RT Presses RT Presses
Autistic .95 (.21) 1.15 (.33) 1.12 (.20) 1.34 (.43) 1.04 (.26) 1.26 (.33) 1.16 (.21) 1.60 (.19)
Typically developing .97 (.14) 1.09 (.20) 1.08 (.15) 1.18 (.24) 1.02 (.16) 1.07 (.26) 1.16 (.18) 1.42 (.23)
Values have been log-transformed to minimise the effects of skewness and kurtosis
Fig. 6 Judgments made in the context-free trials and the extent of bias in the context trials in experiment 3, for autistic and typically developing
children. Individual data points (small crosses) and group means (large crosses) are shown for Ebbinghaus stimuli (left panel) and Müller-Lyer stimuli
(right panel). Distributions smoothed with kernel density functions are shown in red (autistic children) and green (typically developing children).
Data are presented with outliers trimmed
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responses between autistic and typically developing chil-
dren. We found no evidence of reduced susceptibility to
the Ebbinghaus illusion in autistic children for any
method. There was some indication of heightened sus-
ceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion, but only in a
method-of-adjustment task (experiment 3) and not in
the 2-AFC or the same-different methods (experiments
1 and 2).
The evidence we found for heightened susceptibility to
the Müller-Lyer illusion in the method-of-adjustment
(albeit relatively weak) was not entirely unexpected.
Ropar and Mitchell [10] similarly reported a pronounced
bias in response to the Müller-Lyer illusion for autistic
children aged 7 to 18 years using a method-of-adjustment
task. Our lack of group differences for the Müller-Lyer
same-different judgment task is also in line with previous
research, as Happé [7] reported that autistic children were
equally susceptible to the Müller-Lyer illusion as typically
developing children, unlike for a range of other illusions
in which they demonstrated reduced susceptibility.
What can we conclude from these apparently conflict-
ing results? Do autistic children really perceive the
Müller-Lyer illusion differently to typically developing
children? It could be argued that Happé’s method (and
that used in experiment 2) is too insensitive to reveal
differences in the extent of illusion susceptibility be-
tween the groups, as it classifies children into those who
do or do not experience the illusion. Indeed, it is clear
from experiment 2 that the majority of children are
susceptible to the Müller-Lyer illusion. However, it is
particularly informative here that we found no group dif-
ferences in the extent of bias in our novel 2-AFC
method, which was specifically designed to reduce the
influence of higher-level decisional strategies [29]. Thus,
it is likely that any group differences in the method-of-
adjustment Müller-Lyer task merely reflect differences in
decisional criteria, rather than reflecting underlying dif-
ferences in perception. It is interesting to note that
Chouinard et al. [22] reported reduced susceptibility to
the Müller-Lyer illusion in typical members of the popula-
tion with high levels of autistic traits, as measured by the
AQ. It seems that these results may not be generalizable
to the autistic population, as no studies to date have re-
ported reduced susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion
in those with a clinical diagnosis.
Our results on the Ebbinghaus illusion are very clear,
as we found no group differences in susceptibility to the
illusion in any method we used. These results fit within
a complex pattern of results from previous studies, in-
cluding both reports of reduced susceptibility (e.g., [7]),
and no differences in susceptibility (e.g. [10, 16]) for
autistic individuals. Such discrepant results may arise in
part from the use of different methodologies. Yet, here
we found no differences in susceptibility between autistic
and typically developing children across three different
methods, including a task based on Happé [7]. It should
be noted, however, that our stimuli differed from those
used by Happé and others. For example, our stimuli
were presented in white on grey, whereas Happé’s stim-
uli were black and white, and the context circles in our
Ebbinghaus stimuli did not touch, whereas they did in
Happé’s stimuli. Stimulus differences such as these may
be contributing factors in determining the extent to
which autistic children are influenced by the Ebbinghaus
illusion. A further difference is that we tested cognitively
able autistic children (IQ > 70), whereas Happé tested
autistic children with a lower range of IQ scores (verbal
IQ range 40–92), although here we found no evidence of
a correlation between bias and IQ in the Ebbinghaus
tasks. It is possible that previous reports of reduced sus-
ceptibility to the Ebbinghaus task resulted from atypical
decision strategies in autistic populations, on which
sampling differences may have a particularly pronounced
effect. Anecdotally, many of our participants reported
‘knowing’ the illusions from science books and TV
shows, which may have substantially affected their re-
sponses in experiments 2 and 3. A large number of the
children we tested did not answer the control question
correctly in experiment 2 (n = 16 in the Ebbinghaus
task). As the control stimuli were perceptually identical,
such responses again point to a strong role for decisional
biases.
Although we made extensive efforts to ensure that the
samples tested in each experiment were of comparable
age and non-verbal ability, it is a limitation of the
current study that we were not able to test all experi-
mental conditions within the same participants. The
sample sizes used were relatively large for studies inves-
tigating susceptibility to visual illusions in an autistic
population. Nevertheless, the exact sample size used var-
ied between experiments and between groups of autistic
and typically developing children. It is possible that the
smaller samples were less sensitive to group differences
than those with larger sample sizes. Indeed, our use of
Bayesian statistics confirms the need for larger sample
sizes to conclusively distinguish between the null and
alternative hypotheses in certain conditions in experi-
ments 2 and 3. Thus, future studies would benefit from
collecting data from large samples for both the autistic
and typically developing groups. Specifically, future re-
search will need to confirm the key finding of increased
bias to the Müller-Lyer illusion in the method-of-
adjustment task in conjunction with similar levels of bias
in the 2-AFC task, within the same sample of autistic
participants.
Previous reports of reduced susceptibility to visual illu-
sions have been linked to theories of autistic perception
and cognition, such as weak central coherence [7] and
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reduced influence of top-down information [14, 26, 27].
The results of this study and other studies refute the
suggestion that children on the autism spectrum have
pervasively different responses to visual illusions com-
pared to typically developing children. Indeed, the re-
sults from experiment 1 that measure perceptual bias
suggest that autistic children process the context in the
Ebbinghaus illusion and Müller-Lyer illusion similarly to
typically developing children (cf. the weak central coher-
ence theory [25]).
We may well expect distinct effects for different illu-
sions. For example, autistic individuals may have re-
duced susceptibility to illusions that rely heavily on prior
knowledge, such as the Shepard table illusion [14], des-
pite not demonstrating reduced susceptibility to the
Ebbinghaus illusion, which may result from lateral inter-
actions in lower-level areas of the visual system such as
V1 [49, 50]. A feasible hypothesis would be that we
should only find atypical responses by autistic individ-
uals to illusions that result from top-down processing.
However, the state of existing research evidence does
not yet allow us to make clear links with such theories,
as previous reports of reduced susceptibility to illusions
could be a result of atypical decisional strategies, rather
than reflecting differences in perceptual processing.
Adapting relatively bias-free methods to a range of
different illusions will therefore be important in further
investigating atypical visual perception in autism. One
outstanding question is whether different illusions lead
to differing levels of response bias. Indeed, the fact that
we found significant group differences in performance in
the method-of-adjustment Müller-Lyer task but not the
Ebbinghaus task suggests that the Müller-Lyer illusion
might be particularly sensitive to atypical decisional stra-
tegies—perhaps as a result of the illusion being stronger
in general.
The methodological issues we highlight here are not
restricted to studies of autism, and we stress the import-
ance of designing studies that minimise decision biases
whenever the focus is on underlying perceptual mecha-
nisms. Our study demonstrates that the method devel-
oped by Morgan et al. [29], which is relatively free of
cognitive bias, can be adapted successfully for children
and clinical populations. Our use of a child-friendly
‘game’ context ensured that child participants were en-
gaged with the task and sufficiently motivated to
complete the trials. Future studies may benefit from
employing a similar method in order to determine
whether atypical responses to illusions in other clinical
groups, such as schizophrenia (e.g. [51]), reflect real per-
ceptual differences compared to neurotypical popula-
tions. The method could also be used to investigate
perceptual development. While we found no evidence of
age-related changes in bias in the current sample, it is
possible that this would become evident in a larger sam-
ple of children across discrete age groups—allowing the
possibility to confirm whether age-related changes in
susceptibility to visual illusions [52–54] really reflect
underlying changes in perceptual functioning. It is worth
noting here that Káldy and Kovács [54] used a 2-AFC
method with the intention of minimising bias when
assessing the strength of the Ebbinghaus illusion in chil-
dren. Yet, the 2-AFC method alone does not eliminate
decisional bias, as observers can still guess in favour of
one of the two options when they are unsure [29]. The
combined use of a 2-AFC method with a roving pedes-
tal, as demonstrated here, ensures that perceptual bias
can be measured as purely as possible, in a wide range
of populations.
Conclusions
Using a new method to measure susceptibility to
Ebbinghaus and Müller-Lyer illusions while minimising
the contaminating effects of decisional biases, we found
no evidence of differences in susceptibility between autis-
tic and typically developing children. These results provide
an important step in bridging behaviour with biological
substrates, suggesting that group differences in suscepti-
bility to illusions may emerge in higher-level decision-
making rather than at the level of the percept.
Endnotes
1Note that Ropar and Mitchell [10] previously consid-
ered the possibility that the performance of Happé’s [7]
autistic individuals could have resulted from biases in ver-
bal responses. However, the point we make here applies to
responses made both verbally and non-verbally.
2The pedestal sizes for the Ebbinghaus stimulus were
taken from Morgan et al. [29]. Pilot testing revealed the
need for a larger pedestal size for the Müller-Lyer
illusion.
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